

A FRAMEWORK FOR TRANSPARENCY AUDIT

The RTI Act under section 4 provides a comprehensive framework for promoting openness in the functioning of the public authorities.

While Section 4(1) (a) provides a general guideline for record management, so that the information could be easily stored and retained, the sub-sections b,c and d of Section 4 relate to the organizational objects and functions. Sub-sections (b), (c) and (d) of Section 4 of the RTI Act and other related information can be grouped under six categories; namely, 1-organsiation and function, 2- Budget and programmes, 3- Publicity and public interface, 4-E. governance, 5-Information as prescribed and 6. Information disclosed on own initiative.

1. Organisation and Function

S.No.	Item	Details of disclosure	Particulars
1.1	Particulars of its organisation, functions and duties [Section 4(1)(b)(i)]	(i) Name and address of the Organization and its website	Police Station Vigilance, UT, Chandigarh. Address i.e. Additional Deluxe Building (Police Headquarters) Sector 09, UT, Chandigarh. The information of Vigilance Cell related to RTI proactive disclosure is available on the website of Chd. Admn. Website: www.chandigarh.gov.in or link https://chandigarh.gov.in/vigilance
		(ii) Head of the organization	The Chief Secretary-cum-CVO, U.T., Chandigarh
		(iii) Vision, Mission and Key objectives	Attached at Annexure-1
		(iv) Function and duties	Attached at Annexure-2
		(v) Organization Chart	Organizational Set-up in the Chief Vigilance UT Chandigarh Officers <ul style="list-style-type: none">Chief Vigilance Officer 1Secretary Vigilance 1

			<p>Staff :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Superintendent Gr-I 1 • Sr. Assistant 1 • Clerk 4 • Total 6 <p>The Office of the Superintendent of Police –cum- Incharge, Vigilance Cell, U.T. Chandigarh consists of the following staff strength:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Officer on Special Duty (DSP) 1 • Inspector of Police 2 • Head Constable 1 • Constable 6 • Total 10
1.2	Power and duties of its officers and employees [Section 4(1)(b)(ii)]	(i) Powers and duties of officers (administrative, financial and judicial)	As per BNS, BNSS& BSA and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
		(ii) Power and duties of other employees	As per BNS, BNSS and Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
		(iii) Rules/ orders under which powers and duty are derived;	Vigilance Manual, 2021, BNS, BNNS& BSA., Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and IPC.
		(iv) Exercised	As per Rules
		(v) Work allocation	As per organization chart
1.3	Procedure followed in decision making process [Section 4(1)(b)(iii)]	(i) Process of decision making Identify key decision making points	All the administrative decisions are being taken at the level of Chief Vigilance Officer.
		(ii) Final decision making authority	Chief Vigilance Officer, U.T. Chandigarh
		(iii) Related provisions, acts, rules etc.	Vigilance Manual, 2021

			(iv) Time limit for taking a decisions, if any	As per specific subject matter.
			(v) Channel of supervision and accountability	<p style="text-align: center;">Organization Chart</p> <p>Organizational Setup in the Chief Vigilance UT Chandigarh</p> <p>Officers</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chief Vigilance Officer 1 • Secretary Vigilance 1 <p>Staff :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Superintendent Gr-I 1 • Sr. Assistant 1 • Clerk 4 • Total 6 <p>The Office of the Superintendent of Police –cum- Incharge, Vigilance Cell, U.T. Chandigarh consists of the following staff strength:-</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Officer on Special Duty (DSP) 1 • Inspector of Police 2 • Head Constable 1 • Constable 6 • Total 10
1.4	Norms discharge functions [Section 4(1)(b)(iv)]	for of	(i) Nature of functions/ services offered	As mentioned in Annexure-II
			(ii) Norms/ standards for functions/ service delivery	As per rules
			(iii) Process by which these services can be accessed	<p>The Chief Secretary, U.T., Chandigarh is the Chief Vigilance Officer of U.T., Chandigarh. He provides the link between various offices of Chandigarh Administration and the Central Vigilance Commission/Central Bureau of Investigation. The main functions are divided into three parts viz :</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 1.Preventive Vigilance • 2.Punitive Vigilance

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3.Surveillance and Detection <p>The Office of the Officer on Special Duty (Vigilance), U.T. Chandigarh has been declared a Police Station, having its jurisdiction within whole of the U.T., Chandigarh, for the purpose of the offences mentioned in the Schedule of the notification. The Officer on Special Duty (Vigilance) in the rank of DSP is empowered under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to investigate any offence punishable under the above Act without the order of a Magistrate of the 1st Class or make any arrest therefore without a warrant. Similar powers of investigation have also been conferred upon the Inspectors of Police posted in the Vigilance Cell. The Vigilance Cell, Chandigarh also conducts enquiries in respect of employees of U.T., Chandigarh, including Boards/Corporations which are functioning under the Administrative control of Chandigarh as entrusted by the CVO, Chandigarh. Such inquiry reports are submitted by the Vigilance Cell, Chandigarh to the CVO, for further action.</p>
		(iv) Time-limit for achieving the targets	As per concerned subject matter
		(v) Process of redress of grievances	As mentioned in Annexure-II
1.5	Rules, regulations, instructions manual and records for discharging functions [Section 4(1)(b)(v)]	(i) Title and nature of the record/ manual /instruction.	Vigilance Manual, 2021
		(ii) List of Rules, regulations, instructions manuals and records.	
		(iii) Acts/ Rules manuals etc.	
		(iv) Transfer policy and transfer orders	As per Vigilance Manual, 2021 and Central Vigilance Commission instructions issued from time to time, which are accessible at www.cvc.gov.in
1.6	Categories of documents held by the authority under its control	(i) Categories of documents	Not applicable
		(ii) Custodian of documents/categories	Not applicable

	[Section 4(1)(b) (vi)]		
1.7	Boards, Councils, Committees and other Bodies constituted as part of the Public Authority [Section 4(1)(b)(viii)]	(i) Name of Boards, Council, Committee etc. (ii) Composition (iii) Dates from which constituted (iv) Term/ Tenure (v) Powers and functions (vi) Whether their meetings are open to the public? (vii) Whether the minutes of the meetings are open to the public? (viii) Place where the minutes if open to the public are available?	Not applicable
1.8	Directory of officers and employees [Section 4(1) (b) (ix)]	(i) Name and designation	1. Ms. Geetanjali Khandelwal, IPS, Superintendent of Police, Vigilance, UT, Chandigarh, 01722760836, sspvigc.chd@nic.in 2. Sh. A.Venkatesh, OSD/Vigilance, 01722760820, vigilance-chd@nic.in 3. Sh. Ranjodh Singh, Insp./SHO, PS-Vigilance, 01722760820, pshops-vig@chd.gov.in 4. Sh Shadi Lal, Inspector, PS-Vigilance, 01722760820, pshops-vig@chd.gov.in, 5. Sh. Pardeep Kumar, ASI/LR, PS-Vigilance, 01722760820 6. Sh. Samsudeen, Head Constable/PR, PS- Vigilance 01722760820 7. Sh. Sandeep Kumar, Head Constable/(PR), PS-Vigilance 01722760820 8. Sh. Jaspreet Singh, Sr. Ct, PS-Vigilance 01722760820 9. Smt. Usha Devi, Sr. L/C, PS- Vigilance 01722760820 10. Smt. Reena Majoka, L/C, PS- Vigilance 01722760820

			11. Sh. Manjeet Singh Sr. Ct., PS-Vigilance 01722760820
		(ii) Telephone , fax and email ID	01722760820 01722740012 Email id- vigilance-chd@nic.in & pshops-vig@chd.gov.in
1.9	Monthly Remuneration received by officers & employees including system of compensation [Section 4(1) (b) (x)]	(i) List of employees with Gross monthly remuneration	Sh. A. Venkatesh, OSD/ Vigilance, = 123777/- Sh. Ranjodh Singh Insp./SHO, PS-Vigilance, =177937/- Sh Shadi Lal, Insp., PS-Vigilance, Chd = 129519/- Sh Pardeep Kumar, ASI/LR PS-Vigilance, = 111924/- Sh. Samsudeen, Head Constable/PR PS- Vigilance =102495/- Sh. Sandeep Kumar Head Constable (PR)/ PS- Vigilance = 91575/- Sh. Jaspreet Singh Sr., Ct./PS-Vigilance =89127/- Smt. Usha Devi 1863/CP, Sr. L/C PS- Vigilance =89127/- Smt. Reena Majoka, L/C, PS-Vigilance =89127/- Sh. Manjeet Singh, Sr. Ct. PS-Vigilance =99727/- (Details of all for the month of March-2025)
		(ii) System of compensation as provided in its regulations	As per Rules
1.10	Name, designation and other particulars of public information officers [Section 4(1) (b) (xvi)]	(i) Name and designation of the public information officer (PIO), Assistant Public Information (s) & Appellate Authority	Ms. Geetanjali Khandelwal, IPS, Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Appellate Authority Sh. A. Venkatesh, OSD/Vigilance (PIO) Sh. Ranjodh Singh Insp./SHO, PS-Vigilance (APIO)
		(ii) Address, telephone numbers and email ID of each designated official.	Ms. Geetanjali Khandelwal, IPS, Superintendent of Police (Vigilance), Appellate Authority, 4th floor Police Headquarters Sector 09, Chandigarh (01722760836) sspvigc.chd@nic.in Sh. A. Venkatesh, OSD/Vigilance, (CPIO) Police Station Vigilance, Sector-09,UT, Chandigarh(7087239002&01722760820) vigilance-chd@nic.in Sh. Ranjodh Singh Insp./SHO,PS-Vigilance, Police Station Vigilance, UT, Chandigarh(9417008173& 01722740012) pshops-vig@chd.gov.in
1.11	No. Of employees against whom	No. of employees against whom disciplinary action has been	Nil

	Disciplinary action has been proposed/ taken (Section 4(2))	(i) Pending for Minor penalty or major penalty proceedings	
		(ii) Finalised for Minor penalty or major penalty proceedings	Nil
1.12	Programmes to advance understanding of RTI (Section 26)	(i) Educational programmes	Training is being imparted to the officers/officials from time to time as per Administration instructions.
		(ii) Efforts to encourage public authority to participate in these programmes	
		(iii) Training of CPIO/APIO	
		(iv) Update & publish guidelines on RTI by the Public Authorities concerned	

2. Budget and Programme

S.No.	Item	Details of disclosure	Particulars
2.1	Budget allocated to each agency including all plans, proposed expenditure and reports on disbursements made etc. [Section 4(1)(b)(xi)]	(i) Total Budget for the public authority=	Rs.18600000/- (F/Y 2024-2025) Actual Expenditure of different Heads.
		(ii) Budget for each agency and plan & programmes	Salaries= Rs.= 8530000/- Allowances= Rs. = 5500000/- Wages= Rs.= 130000/- Medical Treatment= Rs.= 50000/- Domestic Travel expenses= Rs. = 10000/- Office Expenses= Rs.= 600000/- Secret Service= Rs.= 2500000/-
		(iii) Proposed expenditures=	Rs.18600000/-(F/Y 2024-2025)

		(iv) Revised budget for each agency, if any	Not applicable
		(v) Report on disbursements made and place where the related reports are available	Through Public Financial Management System (PFMS)
2.2	Foreign and domestic tours (F.No. 1/8/2012- IR dt. 11.9.2012)	(i) Budget	Not applicable
		(ii) Foreign and domestic Tours by ministries and officials of the rank of Joint Secretary to the Government and above, as well as the heads of the Department. a) Places visited b) The period of visit c) The number of members in the official delegation d) Expenditure on the visit	Nil
		(iii) Information related to procurements a) Notice/tender enquires, and corrigenda if any thereon, b) Details of the bids awarded comprising the names of the suppliers of goods/ services being procured, c) The works contracts concluded – in any such combination of the above-and d) The rate /rates and the total amount at which such procurement or works contract is to be executed.	Nil
2.3	Manner of execution of subsidy programme [Section 4(i)(b)(xii)]	(i) Name of the programme of activity	Not applicable
		(ii) Objective of the programme	Not applicable

		(iii) Procedure to avail benefits	Not applicable
		(iv) Duration of the programme/ scheme	Not applicable
		(v) Physical and financial targets of the programme	Not applicable
		(vi) Nature/ scale of subsidy /amount allotted	Not applicable
		(vii) Eligibility criteria for grant of subsidy	Not applicable
		(viii) Details of beneficiaries of subsidy programme (number, profile etc)	Not applicable
2.4	Discretionary and non-discretionary grants [F. No. 1/6/2011-IR dt. 15.04.2013]	(i) Discretionary and non-discretionary grants/ allocations to State Govt./ NGOs/other institutions	Not applicable
		(ii) Annual accounts of all legal entities who are provided grants by public authorities	Not applicable
2.5	Particulars of recipients of concessions, permits of authorizations granted by the public authority [Section 4(1) (b) (xiii)]	(i) Concessions, permits or authorizations granted by public authority	Not applicable
		(ii) For each concessions, permit or authorization granted a) Eligibility criteria b) Procedure for getting the concession/ grant and/ or permits of authorizations c) Name and address of the recipients given concessions/ permits or authorisations d) Date of award of concessions /permits of authorizations	Not applicable
2.6	CAG & PAC paras	CAG and PAC paras and the action taken reports (ATRs)	Not applicable

		after these have been laid on the table of Administration, UT., Chandigarh.	
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3. Publicity Band Public interface

S.No.	Item	Details of disclosure	Particulars
3.1	Particulars for any arrangement for consultation with or representation by the members of the public in relation to the formulation of policy or implementation there of [Section 4(1)(b)(vii)] [F No 1/6/2011-IR dt. 15.04.2013]	Arrangement for consultations with or representation by the members of the public	Not applicable
		(i) Relevant Acts, Rules, Forms and other documents which are normally accessed by citizens	
		(ii) Arrangements for consultation with or representation by	Not applicable
		a) Members of the public in policy formulation/ policy implementation	
		b) Day & time allotted for visitors	
		c) Contact details of Information & Facilitation Counter (IFC) to provide publications frequently sought by RTI applicants	
		Public- private partnerships (PPP)	Not applicable
		(i) Details of Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), if any	
		(ii) Detailed project reports (DPRs)	Not applicable
		(iii) Concession agreements.	Not applicable
		(iv) Operation and maintenance manuals	Not applicable
		(v) Other documents generated as part of the implementation of the PPP	Not applicable
		(vi) Information relating to fees, tolls, or the other kinds of revenues that may be collected under authorisation from the government	Not applicable

		(vii) Information relating to outputs and outcomes	Not applicable
		(viii) The process of the selection of the private sector party (concessionaire etc.)	Not applicable
		(ix) All payment made under the PPP project	Not applicable
3.2	Are the details of policies / decisions, which affect public, informed to them [Section 4(1) (c)]	<p>Publish all relevant facts while formulating important policies or announcing decisions which affect public to make the process more interactive;</p> <p>(i) Policy decisions/ legislations taken in the previous one year</p>	Nil
		(ii) Outline the Public consultation process	Not applicable
		(iii) Outline the arrangement for consultation before formulation of policy	Not applicable
3.3	Dissemination of information widely and in such form and manner which is easily accessible to the public [Section 4(3)]	<p>Use of the most effective means of communication</p> <p>(i) Internet (website)</p>	<p>The information regarding Vigilance Department is available at CVC website www.cvc.nic.in. The information of Vigilance Cell related to RTI proactive disclosure is available on the website of Chd. Admn.</p> <p>https://chandigarh.gov.in/vigilance and e-vigilance portal https://evigilance.chd.gov.in</p>
3.4	Form of accessibility of information manual/handbook [Section 4(1)(b)]	<p>Information manual/handbook available in</p> <p>(i) Electronic format</p> <p>(ii) Printed format</p>	<p>All the information regarding manual/handbook/instructions available at the websites The information regarding Vigilance Department is available at CVC website www.cvc.nic.in , https://chandigarh.gov.in/vigilance and e-vigilance portal https://evigilance.chd.gov.in.</p>

3.5	Whether information manual/handbook available free of cost or not [Section 4(1)(b)]	List of materials available Free of cost	The information regarding Vigilance Department is available at CVC website www.cvc.nic.in , https://chandigarh.gov.in/vigilance , and e-vigilance portal https://evigilance.chd.gov.in , free of cost
		At a reasonable cost of the medium	

4. E.Governance

S.No	Item	Details of disclosure	Particulars
4.1	Language in which Information Manual/Handbook Available [F No. 1/6/2011-IR dt. 15.4.2013]	(i) English	English
		(ii) Vernacular/ Local Language	Not applicable
4.2	When was the information Manual/Handbook last updated? [F No. 1/6/2011-IR dt 15.4.2013]	Last date of Annual updation	The Websites are being updated from time to time.
4.3	Information available in electronic form [Section 4(1)(b)(xiv)]	(i) Details of information available in electronic form	The information regarding Vigilance Department is available at CVC website www.cvc.nic.in . The information of Vigilance Cell related to RTI proactive disclosure is available on the website of Chd. Admn. https://chandigarh.gov.in/vigilance and e-vigilance portal https://evigilance.chd.gov.in
		(ii) Name/ title of the document/record/ other information	
		(iii) Location where available	
4.4	Particulars of facilities available to citizen for obtaining information [Section 4(1)(b)(xv)]	(i) Name & location of the faculty	The information regarding Vigilance Department is available at CVC website www.cvc.nic.in , https://chandigarh.gov.in/vigilance and e-vigilance portal https://evigilance.chd.gov.in 0172-2760820, 0172-2700412
		(ii) Details of information made available	
		(iii) Working hours of the facility	
		(iv) Contact person & contact details (Phone, fax email)	

4.5	Such other information as may be prescribed under section 4(i)(b)(xvii)	(i) Grievance redressed mechanism	As mentioned in Annexure-II
		(ii) Details of applications received under RTI and information provided	58 RTI applications received and disposed off accordingly (Financial Year 2024-25).
		(iii) List of completed schemes/ projects/ Programmes	Not applicable
		(iv) List of schemes/ projects/ programme underway	
		(v) Details of all contracts entered into including name of the contractor, amount of contract and period of completion of contract	
		(vi) Annual Report	
		(vii) Frequently Asked Question (FAQs)	
		(viii) Any other information such as a) Citizen's Charter	
		b) Result Framework Document (RFD)	
		c) Six monthly reports loaded on the websited or not	
		d) Performance against the benchmarks set in the Citizen's Charter	
4.6	Receipt & Disposal of RTI applications & appeals [F.No. 1/6/2011-IR dt. 15.04.2013]	(i) Details of applications received and disposed	58 RTI applications received and disposed off accordingly (Financial Year 2024-25).
		(ii) Details of appeals received and orders issued	06 appeals were received and the same were disposed off. (Financial Year 2024-25).
4.7	Replies to questions asked in the parliament [Section 4(1)(d)(2)]	Details of questions asked and replies given	Nil

Information as may be prescribed

S. No.	Item	Details of disclosure	Particulars
5.1	Such other information as may be prescribed [F.No. 1/2/2016-IR dt. 17.8.2016, F No. 1/6/2011-IR dt. 15.4.2013]	(i) Name & details of (a) Current CPIOs & FAAs Earlier CPIO & FAAs from 1.1.2015	Current CPIO = Sh. A. Venkatesh, OSD/Vigilance 7087239002 Current FAA = Ms. Geetanjali Khandelwal, IPS, SP/Vigilance 0172-2760836 Earlier CPIO & FAAs from 01.01.2015 Earlier CPIOs Sh J.L Meena DANIPS OSD/Vig. Sh Sukhraj Katewa DANIPS OSD/Vig. Sh Deepak Yadav DANIPS OSD/Vig. Earlier FAAs Sh Manish Chaudhary, IPS SP/Vig. Sh Eish Singal, IPS SP/Vig. Sh Ravi Kumar, IPS SP/Vig. Ms. Niharika Bhatt, IPS SP/Vig. Sh Manoj Kumar Meena, IPS SP/Vig. Sh. Ketan Bansal IPS, SP/Vigilance
		(ii) Details of third party audit of voluntary disclosure (a) Dates of audit carried out (b) Report of the audit carried out	Yes, Third Party Audit has been carried out by the team of MGSIPA on 07/5/2025.
		(iii) Appointment of Nodal Officers not below the rank of Joint Secretary/ Additional HoD (a) Date of appointment (b) Name & Designation of the officers	Not applicable
		(iv) Consultancy committee of key stake holders for advice on	Not applicable

		suo-motu disclosure (a) Dates from which constituted (b) Name & Designation of the officers	
		(v) Committee of PIOs/FAAs with rich experience in RTI to identify frequently sought information under RTI (a) Dates from which constituted (b) Name & Designation of the Officers	Not applicable

6. Information Disclosed on own Initiative

S.No.	Item	Details of disclosure	Particulars
6.1	Item/ information disclosed so that public have minimum resort to use of RTI Act to obtain information		Police Station Vigilance, UT, Chandigarh. Address i.e. Additional Deluxe Building (Police Headquarters) Sector 09, UT, Chandigarh. The information of Vigilance Cell related to RTI proactive disclosure is available on the website of Chd. Admn. Website: www.chd.gov.in or link https://chandigarh.gov.in/vigilance

Annexure-1

(Vision, Mission and Key objectives)

- Preventive Vigilance
- Punitive Vigilance
- Surveillance and Detection

Anti-Corruption Measures

Executive Summary

Corruption is the illegal use of public power for private gain or political ends. Widespread corruption imposes serious costs on states by undermining legitimacy, deterring investment, and limiting the capacity to collect taxes and to implement programs fairly. Although no single solution applies everywhere, some proposals have broad applicability to most democracies in transition. Some proposals can produce political gains for those who support them and do not involve high budgetary costs.

I. Democracies should expand mechanisms of external and internal accountability.

- External accountability requires the public disclosure of information so that private watchdog groups and the media can monitor this information and complain about irregularities.
- Internal accountability requires one part of the government to monitor another part.

II. Specific sectoral strategies: some examples

- Tax collection: simplify tax rules and shift to more easily measured types of taxes.
- Police reform: may involve retraining, reorganization and citizen complaint mechanisms.
- Health care: reduce routine payoffs by privatizing services and increasing public funding.
- Procurement and privatization: introduce more competitive and transparent procedures.

REPORT

Corruption is the illegal use of public power for private gain or political ends. It can occur when public officials have power to dispense benefits or impose costs on private individuals and businesses. Widespread corruption can impose serious costs on countries making a transition to democracy. It can undermine the legitimacy of the state in the eyes of citizens and of investors, both domestic and international. Regimes that face criticisms from their citizens should recognize that public condemnation of corruption means that people are beginning to expect the state to act in their interest. They are demanding accountability from political, bureaucratic, and judicial actors in return for their political support. Democratic regimes need to respond in a way that produces

real reforms and does not leave them open to the criticism that they are using anti-corruption campaigns to silence and discredit political opponents while overlooking serious problems within their own governments.

Attempts to reduce corruption should focus on the costs in terms of decreased state legitimacy and reduced economic functioning. Corruption deters investment and limits economic growth. It encourages the development of illegal businesses and the shadow economy. Corruption undermines state capacity by limiting the states ability to collect taxes and to enforce regulatory and spending programs fairly. It also threatens the legitimacy of the democratic experiment by reducing public trust in government. Citizens may begin to view all who participate in politics as tainted and hence may limit their participation in the project of state building by turning to purely private concerns. Worse, they may become corrupt themselves out of cynicism and despair.

What practical steps can political leaders take to limit corruption in ways that can have real payoffs in promoting the institutionalization of democracy, but that recognize the political and resource constraints under which governments operate? Obviously, there is no single blueprint that will apply everywhere. The nature of the problem varies from state to state. Nevertheless, we can make some suggestions that ought to have broad applicability to many democracies in transition. Our basic claim is that corruption cannot be addressed by the state acting alone. Because corruption is a product of the interaction between public officials and private individuals and business firms, it can only be addressed by policies that require both the public and the private sector to take responsibility for limiting payoffs and self-dealing. Many states are experiencing a vicious cycle in which corruption breeds corruption. Instead, the goal is to produce a virtuous cycle where honesty breeds honesty.

We emphasize two types of strategies below, not because they are the only ones that are relevant, but because they seem to us to be a necessary part of any serious reform agenda and because they can be at least partially accomplished so long as the necessary leadership is forthcoming from the top of government. Our primary focus is on alternative methods of achieving greater accountability as a means of exposing and deterring corruption. However, we also discuss the possibility of beginning the anti-corruption effort by focusing on one or two particularly important areas of government functioning. We conclude with some observations on the political costs and benefits of alternative strategies.

I. Accountability

Democracies ought not to rely on the criminal law as the only tool against corruption. It is needed as a backup, but it should be combined with mechanisms of external and internal accountability. By external accountability we mean state openness to scrutiny by the public. By internal accountability we mean the use of organs of state power to limit incentives for corruption. Furthermore, private firms should be required to make certain information available and encouraged to develop internal procedures to limit corruption. Finally, accountability can be affected by the decentralization of state functions.

Discuss the possibility of beginning the anti-corruption effort by focusing on one or two particularly important areas of government functioning. We conclude with some observations on the political costs and benefits of alternative strategies.

I. A. External Accountability

Elections are the fundamental means of achieving accountability in democracies, but they are not sufficient to ensure the day-to-day integrity of government. This is so even in political systems with credible opposition parties that can use accusations of corruption as part of a strategy to gain power. Thus, we focus here on other forms of external accountability. They all require the public disclosure of information and workable mechanisms for public participation and complaints.

First, consider the transparency of the electoral process itself. Candidates should disclose the sources of campaign funds in a timely manner. They should also disclose their families personal finance interests in companies that could benefit from government policies. Private watchdog groups and the media can then monitor and publicize this information. The state needs to establish a small number of clear rules both about conflict of interest for high officials and legislators and about the sources of campaign funds. The point is to have rules that are clear to candidates before the campaign and that can be complied with under realistic conditions.

The media should be free to criticize public officials with little fear of running afoul of libel laws some countries have anti-insult laws that punish the media for being outspoken. However unfair the media may sometimes be, such laws can seriously hamper anti-corruption efforts by dampening criticism.

Public financing is frequently mentioned as a solution, but in poor countries it is unlikely to be a realistic option. In any case, it needs to be structured to avoid favoring incumbents. This can be done by giving citizens vouchers to spend on whatever candidate they wish or by an allocation procedure that disfavors incumbents.

Second, the operation of the bureaucracy and the legislature needs to be subject to scrutiny. The goal is to make corrupt deals difficult to hide from a vigilant public. There are four parts to such a strategy. First, the government needs routinely to make information available on budgets and the contents of laws and executive decrees. The Internet has drastically reduced the costs of such strategies by making it easy for governments to supply information to a broad audience. Second, a freedom of information act is a key part of the structure. Such acts permit citizens to access government information that is in the files but has not been published. Those requesting information need not have a personal interest at stake; they can demand disclosure simply in their capacity as citizens or members of the media. Exceptions can be added to the law to protect privacy and security interests. Third, the state must make it easy for groups to organize as nonprofit, issue-oriented groups or as business associations Private sector monitoring of the public sector cannot solely be the province of individual citizens; groups are needed because they can provide expertise and continuity. The state should not impose substantive requirements on registered groups but should, instead, limit itself to assuring that the groups are not acting as fronts for the personal financial interests of their founders. Of course, a free media also needs to exist as well. Fourth, once private groups or individuals have access to information, there must be an effective means of seeking redress or registering complaints short of urging criminal prosecutions. For individuals this might be an Ombudsman, but for larger policy concerns, such as corruption in major contracts or service sectors, such as the police, this might involve access to the courts or to an independent oversight commission.

I. B. Internal Accountability

One part of the government can also check another part. The best recent examples are the federal election commissions that appear to have played a positive role in a number of countries, especially in Latin America. These commissions have mostly focused on avoiding fraud in the casting and counting of ballots but they can also serve an anti-corruption goal in monitoring the system of campaign finance and in supervising the collection of candidate's financial disclosure forms. Independent financial control agencies can also serve an important monitoring function but they must operate under clear, simple and transparent procedures so they do not become one more source of red tape and corruption themselves.

More problematic examples are the anti-corruption commissions that have been established in a number of countries. The problem here is not just to assure their independence-often a difficult task-but also to be sure that they focus on important issues. Too many of them have had a mandate that mostly involves law enforcement. Our claim is that corruption cannot be addressed primarily through the criminal law but requires a rethinking of the way government service delivery and regulatory programs are organized. This should be the primary focus of an independent commission.

The judiciary and the public prosecutorial system are key institutions in the fight against corruption. For the development of the private sector, an honest judiciary will facilitate trade and investment by making it possible for arms-length deals to take place against a background of legal protections. Furthermore, an honest judiciary facilitates the control of corruption within government.

Challenges to the corruption of public officials can be resolved in the courts in a way that limits the use of false corruption allegations as a tool of political control and that makes effective punishment for the corrupt more realistic. The courts can also monitor second-order allegations concerning government attempts to hide information. To perform these functions, however, the courts need to be open to suits by citizens or public interest groups seeking to challenge government action or inaction. There are many ways to achieve a professional independent judiciary, and we do not presume to present an preferred method. However, some practices are obviously counter-productive. These include constitutional courts with judges whose terms are identical to the chief executives or provisions that make it easy for the president to remove judges.

I. C. Private Sector Transparency

The private sector also needs to provide information about its own activities to permit the public to monitor its performance. To make it possible to enforce rules on conflict of interest and self-dealing, corporate board memberships need to be public, and companies need to create codes of conduct against corrupt dealings of their own executives. These practice can have an impact not just on the internal behavior of firms but also on the ability of ordinary citizens to track possibly illicit connections between businesses and the state and to publicize instances of state capture by outside interests.

I. D. Decentralization

Recently, it has become fashionable to support decentralization of political power to regions, states, or municipalities as a way of making government more accountable to the people. Some claim that government will be easier to monitor and corruption easier to detect at lower levels of government. There are several problems with this argument. First, it may not be true. National level media and nonprofit watchdogs may function better than local ones. Second, even if citizens of local governments can easily observe the corruption of local leaders there may be nothing that they can do to limit malfeasance. Corrupt local leaders may have a monopoly on power and act with impunity.

Nevertheless, some promising recent experiences in some municipalities and villages in Brazil, Nepal, India and Uganda, suggest that well-designed systems of citizen participation can overcome entrenched patterns of corruption and favoritism in the provision of public goods and services. These experiments all involve broadly participatory procedures either to allocate public funds or to monitor aid projects or grants from higher levels of government. In many cases they supplement the work of formally constituted local government. In a number of situations, higher levels of government or nonprofit organizations with expertise play a role by supplying technical assistance that help the participatory processes to operate Other countries could learn from these experiments.

II. Sectoral Strategies

In some democracies corruption is not all-pervasive but is concentrated in particular sectors. The worry is not just that these sectors are performing poorly but that their weakness will overflow into other sectors and will contribute to a general delegitimation of democracy. Of course, the sectors at risk will differ widely across countries, but we mention a few cases that have posed problems in countries with which we are familiar. They are tax collection, the police, health care, and the related issues of privatization and large-scale procurement.

II. A. Taxes

Corruption in tax and customs collection can produce a vicious cycle. Widespread evasion through payoffs to tax collectors or simple fraud means that a given tax rate produces too little revenue. Hence, tax rates are raised to collect more revenue. As a consequence, even fewer taxes are collected as more taxpayers evade payment. One solution is to lower rates, simplify the rules, and

engage in a credible enforcement effort. Alternatively the tax base could be changed to one that is easier to measure-i.e., a tax on revenue could be substituted for a tax on profits. In some cases the human element can be reduced along with the corrupt incentives it produces. For example, customs collection can be carried out through electronic programs. Where tax collectors are necessary they can be rewarded with performance-based bonuses instead of higher pay.

II. B. Police

Corruption of the police is not uncommon throughout the world in established as well as new democracies. It is often associated with the flourishing of organized crime and of a society where violence and its control have been partially privatized. The police extort payoffs in return for protection from arrest or from fines and both actual lawbreakers and innocent victims are targeted. The venality of the police permits private extortion rackets such as kidnapping rings to function with impunity. There are no easy answers here, but the experience of anti-corruption efforts in the municipalities of established democracies may be of help. In many cases, reform will not be cheap since it will require the recruitment of a more professional group of employees as well as retraining of existing personnel. Reorganization of police work combined with mechanisms for citizens complaints can also help and are less expensive.

II. C. Health Care

The countries in a transition to democracy appear to face a particular problem with corruption in the health care system. Payoffs have become so routine that they are hardly viewed as corrupt; yet, they undermine the social goals of a state-managed system. Here the answer is not a law enforcement crackdown. Rather the state has to face up to pathologies of the existing systems and decide where to legalize payments through privatization and where to retain public funding but increase the states financial commitment in order to reduce incentives for payoffs.

II. D. Privatization and Procurement

The first wave of privatization is largely complete in the post-socialist countries and elsewhere most large scale privatizations have been accomplished. Some of them, however, involved so much corruption and insider dealings that they have little legitimacy in the eyes of ordinary people and may have produced on-going corrupt links to government regulators or providers of subsidies. These cases need to be reexamined to see if more competitive pressures can be introduced. For remaining privatization deals and for all large scale procurement and concessionary deals, many governments may need to introduce more competitive and transparent procurement procedures as well as establish a framework that creates competitive pressures instead of giving monopoly power to insiders. They need to publish procurement rules and procedures ahead of time, and open the bidding process widely.

III. Conclusions: The Importance of a Political Coalition for Reform

Anti-corruption reform is not easy, nor will it always show immediate results. In many cases, longstanding practices have to be changed, and those who benefit from corruption often want to block reforms. Benefits often will not appear immediately, weakening public support and giving opponents an opportunity to challenge policies. Nonetheless, many of the reforms suggested above can be adopted without paying a very high political price. Some of them will attract allies or generate immediate results. Others will not require high budgetary costs, so they can be adopted without threatening other government projects.

First, consider reforms that will not immediately threaten powerful interests. A freedom of information act will provide access to government information, but its impact will only develop gradually as organized groups begin to understand how to use it. Providing more information about government decisions does not require any immediate changes in the policies themselves.

Other reforms will attract allies who can provide political support. Making it easier for non-governmental organizations to organize and register will attract their support. Corporations may benefit from good publicity by adopting anti-corruption codes of conduct . Although local government officials may not always welcome requirements for public hearings or public participation in decisions, if these requirements are accompanied by authority over more decisions, they might be more welcome.

A third group of reforms can be adopted without major new expenditures. These changes would demonstrate that action is being taken without threatening other policies. More information about the content of laws, decrees, and regulations can be made available on the internet at relatively low cost.

Anti-corruption reforms present heads of states and government with an opportunity to demonstrate political leadership on an issue of critical importance to many voters. While corruption will not decline immediately, the small, concrete steps toward greater openness and accountability suggested here lay the foundation for long term changes in expectation and behavior that may eventually reduce the level of corruption. Corruption is often deeply entrenched and notoriously difficult to reduce solely through direct prohibitions or criminal penalties. General strategies aimed at increasing internal and external accountability, combined with specific reforms targeted at the areas of greatest concern in particular countries, stand the best chance of creating favorable conditions for a reduction in corruption. Even though corruption may never be totally eliminated, each step toward reduction makes further steps more likely and helps reduce the real cost of corruption-the ability of governments to govern.

- Of course, some reforms, such as a reconstituted judiciary and an honest police force are likely to be both expensive and politically controversial. However, because the benefits are potentially so large, a bold leader can gain legitimacy and respect by taking on such challenges

Annexure-2 (Function and duties)

Dealing with the Complaints

The following are the nature of complaints received in this department.

- Signed complaints
- Anonymous Complaints
- Pseudonymous complaints
- Source information
- Whatsapp/Mobile helpline complaints
- e-mail complaints

The complaints viz. Signed/Anonymous/pseudonymous complaint/source information received in this department are usually processed and submitted to the Chief Vigilance Officer for orders. Further course of action is taken based on the verifiable nature of the complaint and on the orders of the Chief Vigilance Officer.

The complaints which are not specific or verifiable in nature will be filed after obtaining the orders of the Chief Vigilance Officer. If the same contains any verifiable information/event, those complaints would be referred to the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Police, Unit, U.T. Chandigarh for enquiry and report. The report of the Superintendent of Police which does not substantiate any of the allegations leveled in the complaint, the action on the complaint would be treated as closed. Before such closure, the category of the officials involved in the complaint has to be looked into. If any Group "A" and "B" official is involved in the complaint, then the matter has to be referred to the Central Vigilance Commission, New Delhi and their advice for closure has to be obtained. Only on receipt of the advice from Central Vigilance Commission the action taken on the complaint will end.

If the report of the Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Police Unit reveals prima facie/substantiates any of the allegations leveled in the complaint in which any Group 'A' and 'B' official is found involved, along with other 'C' and 'D' after obtaining orders of the W/Adviser to Administrator-cum-CVO UT, Chandigarh is the Disciplinary Authority in respect of all the Group 'A' and 'B' Officials), the matter would be referred to the Central Vigilance Commission for advice. After the advice of CVO is received, the Administrative Secretary concerned is being requested to cause necessary disciplinary proceeding against the officials involved.

On conclusion of the inquiry by the Inquiry Officer, but before issue of final order, the matter has to be again referred to the Central Vigilance Commission for second stage advice and according to the advice tendered by the Central Vigilance Commission the action pursued on the complaint would be rested.

As far as the complaints containing allegations against Group 'C' and 'D' officials are concerned, the further course of action regarding initiation of disciplinary proceedings/closure of action would be ordered at the level of Chief Vigilance officer, U.T. Chandigarh. These cases need not be sent to the Central Vigilance Commission for advice.

Procedure for lodging complaints with the CVO, UT Chandigarh

Please follow the guidelines and act strictly according to the procedure.

Complaint can be lodged only against officials belonging to the organizations over which CVO, U.T. Chandigarh has jurisdiction namely :

- Chandigarh Administration Ministries/Departments
- Chandigarh Administration Public Sector Undertakings
- Co-Op. Organizations
- Autonomous organizations of Government of Chandigarh
- Local Bodies.
-

The CVO has no jurisdiction over private individuals and other State/Central Governments. Therefore please do not lodge complaints against officials of these organizations.

- Complaints must be brief and contain factual details, verifiable facts and related matters. They should not be vague or contain absurd allegations and sweeping statements since these are liable to be filed.
- Please ensure that the complaint is addressed directly to the Chief Vigilance Officer.
- The complaint will generally be acknowledged by the CVO but it is not possible to keep the complainant up dated with the status of the case. However the complaints are followed by the CVO to its logical conclusion.
- The public lodging complaints are also advised not to continue corresponding on the same subject after receiving the acknowledgement from the CVO.

INVESTIGATION OF CORRUPATION CASES

The Officer on Special Duty (Vigilance) in the rank of DSP is empowered under Section 17 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to investigate any offence punishable under the above Act without the order of a Magistrate of the 1st Class or make any arrest therefore without a warrant. Similar powers of investigation have also been conferred upon the Inspectors of Police posted in the Vigilance Cell.